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FOR RELEASE ON DELIVERY SUNDAY

J.DDRESS BY SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D . , MONTANA)
AT THE
LAW CENTER COMMENCEMENT EXERCISES
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
WASHINGTON, D. C.
SUNDAY, MAY 25, 1975
5:00 P. M., E. S. T.

AFTER VIET NAM:

The

u. s.

cl~ss

A TIME FOR REASSESSMENT

of 1975 is the first to graduate after the

disengagement fr(')m Indochina.

This commencement also

marks the •eginning of the fourth decade since World War II.
Some here, today, among the graduates were active participants
in the recent war .
World War II .

Among the parents , many played a part in

It is something of a confession of my age to

?J'-f ab

note that I was involved in World War I.

~r

I was

w

~

I hasten to

;dQ~

an- ..und~r--ag~asea.ma.n in tne Navy at the time.
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My

remarks will be directed to what we have in common

as different generations of Americans.

Whatever we may not

have, we have the United States in common and at a most diff icult moment in the nation's history.
passing through the aest of times.

Clearly, we are not
Cl early, this is not

freedom's finest hour.
~)

ever, t4t condeJ
generation for the present

the nation1s plight on
the

situat ~on

of affairs. / ' or will I blame

ie

Young pf ple ~id not/ make

in which 1 together, we find

not yet had that oppoj tunity.

As

merel y to be notedt that they
or to correc~ a fe

an older

~urselv~ ; t~ey have

or ol/ er

generat~o~b,

qad time only

t~

it is
add to

of the accumulated mistakes which they

inherited when'tbey were younger.
So, r will :aot l eaa t h js
seape~ts.

Let me

try ~ xste~

~ment

in a search for

to set forth where I think

we are, how we have arrived at this point, and where we

~ay

- 3 hope to go from here , notaa ly in our relations with the rest

n-L M-> •~ J-v.
c.- ~j~~
{} ·

of the world . ~

~

(N-'

G.--

~-,.....!~.. •.Ire........... w

These questions cannot

~e

0¥.-

o--

j.N1J

( -

~ ~

consider ed except in the

context of the experience in Indochina ~ ¥iet Nem ~s a book
that is now closed and , may I add , it is my fervent hope that
it stay closed .

It has

~ een ,

a lock to the nation ' s future .

this long and tragic war, a roadIt has been a funnel into which

has disappeared a massive chunk of the nation's ideals , energies
and expectations .
Altho

the book is closed on

tial that we not f

its costs .

Some readily apparent

d some obscure .

iet Nam, it is essenand great .

They

remarks ,
~

today, it is sufficient

only that 1lift - five thousand

Americans died in the war
Mayaguez affair .

in the

These young

age not much different from

graduating c
~-J

The wounded in Indochina were

~hree

ed thousand .

One

•

- 4 dollars or

public funds were
1 reckoning (all the

will
cost

no~

und~dly

the

paid

will have doubled and doubled again .

In this nation, a lar ge segment of our strength and
resour ces was diverted to support the misbegotten venture .
As a result , much of what needed doing at home by government
was not done or not done very well .

In the name of security

against vague threats from Southeast Asia, the inner security
of the nation was neglected for almost a decade .
The war left the nation's economy in worse straits
than at any time since the Gr eat Depression .
its price in the pr esent inf lation- depression .
sputteringa now and then but
of recovery .

ther ~

On the contrary,

We are paying
There are

are as yet no real signs
~

over ~eight

million people remain

unemployed , with the impact of this figure felt especially
among young

Am~=>rtra.tls

aud ln thP. great metropolitan centers .

- 5 I~flation

continues to plague us, undermining confidence in

the nation's currency both at home and abroad .

Governors and

Mayors from all over the nation beat a path to Washington in
search of funds to keep their jur isdictions financially solvent .
But revenues continue to shrink as prices and , to a lesser
extent , wages continue to rise .
The net result is that in all public services-- safety,
transportation, education , sanitation, or whatever-- shortcomings have been tolerated to the point of breakdown .

The

deterioration is especially serious in the great urban complexes
where , the ever- present tensions of race and poverty, cast a
profaund uncertainty over the inner stability of the nation .
On top of these difficulties , we find ourselves increasingly at the mercy of a petroleum cartel arroad and faced
with sh0rtages of many other basic materials .
made

availa~ le

Congress

h~ ~

great sums of money for resear ch in an effort

to r.tjmula.te acjentjfJ.c- devPlopmE"nt of alternative sources of

- 6 -

energy.

Yet few, if any, answers are being found to

th~

~(
questions.

~

So far there is little to

sho~ ~n

the way of

results.
~~~ uv-f_~l~~
~
J, _ ....,-:~ ~ "- ~ ~ 0
t::C c~~.M--'
~
-1--:-a:,-

~

.

~

~V"'A-

~

cwvz-_ .
•

~u~esent economic problems are uplicated abroad

in many of the countries with whom, since the end of World
War II, we have had
WostePft

the·~losest conn~ctions~

jn part1eulat,

They have been military allieR and

E~rGpQ ~ ~ap~.

we are associated with them in a variety of mutually advantageous economic arrangements.

~ IJ,\<. ~ ~

countries, ('J,:t.e;ly and 'the

The plight of some of these

::::1 ~ ~~ '),f{p.·-ro,

Ufii~n~dom,

for example, is grave.

ProblP-ms of the kind I have mentioned have long cried
out for concentrated public attention.
jection of young energy

~d

They plead for an in-

approaches, fresh intellectual

resources and a new dedication in all aspects of the leadership of this nation.

That it has not been forthcoming, in my

judgment, iA due in no small part to the
notably, to Southeast

A~ia

div~rsions a•ro~d

inthe past decade.

and,

•

0

- 7 Whatever may have led us into the conflict in that
region, it is now clear that the involvement hit us where it
hurt most--in the nation's inner unity.

The war opened with

a Presidential call for support of the Commander- in- Chief; it
was met by a patriotic affirmation of national unity.

Before

the war was over, however, we went through deeper divisions
than any since the Civil vTar.
know at the outset .
ests of this
people .

na~ion

That is the

We know now what we did not

The involvement did not serve the inter~~- e.;,. ; 4_-·or the f\V1et,m:mese, Ct:tbCfdlan ana "Lao't1.a:rr
bitt~r

reality of this frustrating exper-

ience.
We pursued a well- intentioned but impossible dream.
In its pursuit , the lands and peoples of Indochina were torn
and battered almost heyond recognition .

While young Americans

died in the tens of thousands, Vietnamese, Cambodians and
I~otirulA--men,

simple rJ C"eo

~~

women and children- - died in the miliion&-

cu.lturP~...-:V~ et

~eJ

Three

Nam, -C.arnbodi.a-and Las.s:-- were over-

- 8 whelmed hy the technology of modern warfare .

Millions fled

the villages, the hill- towns and the paddy fields . to escape
the hombs and crossfire.

They huddled as refugees in the

cities, there to live in one way or another--including the
widespread trafficking in drugs--off the troops .

The swollen

urban populations were fed, in major part, by imported food
paid for by

u. s.

aid programs .

Ironically, rice had to be

sent from this nation to what is one of the richest rice surplus areas of the world .

While we

~1ere

exporting food to

Indochina, shortages at home pushed prices, sky-high, to
Americans .
Why?

To what end?

Now that recollections of the war

are~

receding

into history, it is important to ask ourselves these questions .
We must ask ourselves what impelled us into this ill- fated
enterprise?

I raise the matter, not to oppn old wounds .

Nor

do I raise it to put the finger of blame on particular indivi-

- 9 duals.

There is blame enough to spare for all concerned--for

a succession of Presidents, a succession of Congresses, a
continuum of military and civilian bureaucrats.

t~re -ts- blame

-enough for all of

- ~enfr,

-us ~ ~ ~

---

I raise ther questions because they must be rnised .
Answers must be sought to them if the events of the past few
weeks in Indochina

~re

to be not merely a depressing end to a

long and bleak chapter in this nation's history but also a new
and hopeful beginning .
We have, in short, an obligation to clarify what we

.i!c

s "G · f\~(1\

were about in'~- Nam,tor so many years .

That is a way of

keeping faith with the Americans whom we sent to Indochina and
who have not come back.

That is an obligation which is owed

to living gener ations and to the future citizens of this nation.
Unless the questions are resolved in all honesty, we will have
learned nothil1g and this nation's historic purpose will have
emerged under the permanent cloud of the war .

On

th ~

other

- 10 -

hand, if an understanding of the tragic experience assures
that this is, indeed, the last Viet Nam, then the sacrifices
which have been exacted will be not without meaning.
It is

po~less,

of

may I

one Pr;(side

finger

eiterate, to

/

or

ano~er,

o

or the ot
or

involved .

ng a

There is

na
Viet Nam did not spring suddenly out of partisan
politics .

Nor did it begin just a few years ago, in 1969,

1966, 1964 or even 1961 .

In my judgment, the

prisea~

involve -

~

ment

~~

a culmination of a foreign policy which was born before

most of the members of this graduating class .
Parents here, today, will remember a great war and
its aftermath over a quarter of a century ago .

They will

remember a military power assembled by a united people , deployed all over the globe and welcomed by the oppressed everywhere in the world .

It was an immense power which overwhelmed

a tyranny in Europe and another in Asia.

- 11 -

After an atomic-sealed victory over Japan, this nation
moved into the post -World War II era, intact , powerful and
dynamic.

In contrast, vast areas of the world lay in ruins

around us, hungry, exhausted and bankrupt .

The inter national

leadership of the United States was sought in these circumstances by friend and enemy even as it came to be opposed by
the Soviet Union .

As we saw it , then, this nation's economic

dynamism was the only hope for what began to be called the
"free world . "

As we saw it, too , this nation's military

supremacy, including an atomic monopoly, was the principal
bulwark against the aggressive spread of what was soon termed
"monolithic Communism."

The term was applied to our erstwhile

ally, the Soviet Union, and all nations and political movements
which fell within what was believed to be the permanent orbit
of Moscow.
There began an era of foreign policy based on those
premises.

Tens of billions of dollars of materials , services

- 12 -

and credits poured out of the United States into other countries,
often to help them to recover and maintain free systems, more
often, to keep them from "going communist . 11

Aid went to Western

Europe, to Asia, to Latin America and eventually, to Africa.
In the name of the United Nations, a war was fought
and financed by this country to hold back communism in Korea.
We led the United Nations into a boycott of the revolutionary
Chinese People's Republic which was held at the time to he in
Moscow's orbit.

Tens of thousands of man-hours of the expen-

sive time of U.

s. government diplomats, agents and employees

were invested in the effort to exclude the Peking government
from the world community, if not to bring it down altogether.
Multiple alliances were built which wove us into a common NATO
defense of Western Europe and linked us in some sort of defense
arrangements with forty nations or more around the globe.
Hundreds of thousands of Americans in uniform went abroad,
into military garrisons and bases in Europe and Japan and

- 13 elsewhere .

Tens of billions of dollars worth of construction,

equipment and weapons and nuclear warheads went with them.
These policies were devised largely in the name of
national security and world peace .

They wer e called, accurately,

bipartisan and were described less accur ately as a mutual
security program.

The fact is that the policies , as late as

the Innochina involvement , were largely a on e - sided effort of
the United States .

Th ey rested on the readines s of this

nation to carry the preponderant burdens of cost and , in the
Jast analysis , notably as in the case of Korea , the Dominican
Republic and Indochina , the weight of direct U. S. military
operations .
For years , there was little reason to question these
policies .

Congress was predisposed by the exper ience of World

War II to accept the leadership of the President .

We were in

a period of so- called cold war with Soviet and Chinese communism .
By the same token, allied nations had no choice but to accept

- 14 the leadership of the United States which alone had the
capacity to sustain this postwar system.
To be sure, there were fla\'lS in the structure even
though they were not readily visible in the ex~uberance of the
times.

In the first place, the security system relied so

heavily on military power to maintain peace and, particularly,
on U.

s.

military power that an undue burden of responsibility

was consigned to the Armed Services even as an excessive drain
was attached to the national economy.

A zeal for a new- found

internationalism, moreover, led us to label virtually everything that we did abroad with that word and led us beyond
essential national needs and humanitarian considerations, into
an incautious involvement in almost every area of the world
either in the name of
progress 11 or

11

11

fighting Communism 11 or

insuring the nation 1 s security. 11

projection of U.

s.

11

promoting
This worldwide

influence involved heavy expenditures of

the people 1 S money for all kinds of aid- programs and the creation of elaborate U.

s.

official establishments abroad .

- 15 Moreover, it prompted us to take on , as allies, a number of
governments who were dependents in all but name and with
highly dubious roots of acceptance among their own people .
The great vitality of the postwar economy of this nation also
creatPd an erroneous belief in its i nexhaustibility.
late as the onset of

the~ N~:~-War,

Even as

we proceeded as though

the nation could have not only guns an d butter but would also
be able to pay for fat and

~ rimmings .

We pursued these policies , flaws and all, with little
change for many years .
which

\'tas

to an end .

We pursued them, however , in a world

changing greatly .

The nation ' s atomic monopoly came

The myth of "monolithic Communism 11 disappeared in

numerous political shifts among the Eastern Europeans and in
the vast upheaval in the Chinese-Soviet relationship .

Newly

independent states appeared in the underdeveloped areas, as
classic colonialism was reduced to an historic relic .

Europe

recovered and went far beyond recovery to new heights

of

- 16 well- being .

New economic dynamisms emerged , notably in Germany

and Japan, even as our own economy showed signs of overwork .
It was in these changed circumstances that we became
involved in Indochina .

We became involved for what had long

been accepted as highly wor thwhile ends .
in the naJn1 resisting " @;gressive
11

of

natiol)B.l security, 11 in the nam

national
I

what were weak and dependent governmen s .

s. E·ASII'\,
We went into

'~ Nam, ~ in

short, on the wheels of thP

same policy and for many of the same reasons that we had gone
into Korea a decade and a half earlier, only this time without
even the modicum of inter national sanction which had, in the
Korean situation, been supplied by the United Nations .

We did

so almost as an habituated response, with far less understanding
of the actual situation in Indochilla and unmindful of the changes
which had taken place in this nation, in Asia and in the world .

- 17 -

was
To have persisted in it in the closing days of the
sudden collapse of the synthetic military government which
existed in Saigon at the time would have been to do violence
to the welfare of the nation and to add to the sur feit of

~
violenee ~which

peninsula .

had already been visited on the Indochinese

In my judgment, the determination of Congress to

face up to and to act on that r eality by refusing to supply
a further billion dollars in military aid was a singular service
to this nation and to the people of Indochina .

We had armed ,

t;LcJ-

~ ..

trained , financed and fought for dubious governments in Viet Nam
and

CambG~~.

We had done our share-- far more than our share--

to inject them with the elements of survival .

What last ditch

effort would have been likely to do anything more?
In writing an end to the involvement in Indochina, I
believe Congress also underscored the beginning of a new era
in the nation's internationRl relations .

Mistakes have been

- 18 -

made during the past thirty years in the con1uct of these
relations and, certainly, Indochina was the last and greatest .
Do not think for a moment, however, that the experience of
these three decades was all a mistake.

Much that was done

had to be done, in the enduring interests of this nation and
the world.

Much that is being done now needs still to be done.

A vast web of trade and cultural relationships, for
example, has been woven with the rest of the world.

It has

served for many years to enhance the lives of hundreds of
millions of people .

By the same token, a sudden sundering of

this web could bring upheavals and conflicts of a most disastrous kind .

-~~

We have also begun to perceive in these

~wenty -

five years, I believe, the dimensions of the problem of maintaining permanent peace.

That perception may make us more aware

of our essential national limitations as well as our vast
national potential .

In the process, we may gain greater aware-

ness of the significance of human interdependency and mutual
concern if the world is ever to know stability. Peace cannot be
maintained by United States power

alone . ~~.~'~-~

("t'-f ~ ~ .~) ·~

- 19 It would compound the tragedy if, in the bitter aftermath . ~,
)

we were to turn our backs on this advance.

It would be a step backward if we were to veer from what hecame
an excessive, one might say, an obsessive international involvement to an extreme of disinvolvement.
That danger has been intensified, it seems to me, not only in
~~~

~

the ,~o st-1Rdoeh ina ~atmosphere

of disillusionment but because

we are in the midst of a serious economic situation at home .
I hope it will be recognized, therefore, that it is

se:. ;;s,rc
possible to withdraw from
world .

~ ~without

seceding from the

If we make that distinction--and I am confident that

the people of this nation and their representatives in Congress
<}J)~~)

will make it- -than it should be

possibl~ ~to

withdraw militarily

not only from Indochina but from the entire Southeast Asian
~-~ ~ ~ ~ o--k_.~

mainland, including

Th~iland, ~without

severing normal inter-

national contact with that region and certainly without
abandoning our vital interests in what transpires on the
periphery of the Asian mainland.

- 20 -

Similarly, we should be able, in

tim~,

to reduce

sharply and re- order the United Stated deployment of over
half a million armed forces and dependents in Western Europe
three decades after World War II without forsaking the essential
mutual pledges of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance.
supported and urged such reductions for a decade.
in Indochina in no way alter
of U.

s.

~

my ~view

I have

The events

that one or two divisions

forces stationed in Europe commits the United States

~~tt-,~_,
no less irrevocably than five .

Timing of

reduction~~is

another

matter but I can only say that the sooner they begin, the more
gradual and less dislocative will they be.
We must, too, in the Congress exercise a firm and
discriminating control over the enormous expenditures which are
made in the name of national defense and, at the same time,
still provide adequately for the security of the nation.
should find it

feasib~to

We

curb the carelessness, costliness

and cosiness which has filtered into the Armed Forces system,
notably in contracting with defense industries, without

- 21 -

demeaning and discouraging the millions of dedicated men and
women who wear the uniform.

We should be capable of shutting

down obsolescent and over - extended aid programs without losing
a human compassion for the other people with whom we share the
earth .
If these adjustments are to be made effectively, it
seems to me that they must be accompanied by new and vigorous
efforts of American diplomacy .

These efforts should be aimed

at securing agreements among nations which would make international stability more dependent on mutual undertakings and
less on the unilateral

cow~itment

this or any other nation .

of the military power of

Such agreements in the Far Pacific,

for example , would have to involve not only the United States
and Ja pan, but also the People's Republic of China, the Soviet
Union, the Philippines and other nations .

Communist or not ,

there is a sufficient pool of common interests in preserving
peace and developing trade among these Asian and Pacific nations
to make the search for new understandings more than a quixotic
venture .

- 22 -

May I say that I find it most helpful in this respect
that President Nixon initiated official contact with the Chinese
People's Republic and that the bi- latera l ties of J a pan and the
Philippines with the

United States
are being gradual ly ah3orbed in

I

the enlarging regional and international contacts of these
nations .

I am hopeful that they will soon be joined by the

Republic of South Korea which remains an area of concern.

I

am hopeful , too, that steps will be initiated by the Chinese on
Taiwan and t i'le Ohinese on the Mainland , looking to the reunification of what is one China .

The security of the Western

Pacific must come to rest far more heavily in the future on
mutual restraint , normal relations and interdependence among
the nations of that region and less on the milit ary power of
the United States .
In regard to Europe , an updated approach to the relationship would presuppose , it seems to me , a substantial shift
away from dependency on NATO and the Warsaw

Pa ~

and a greater

effort to reach agreements which will continue to expand and

- 23 to consolidate constructive ties between East and West Europe .
In the talks between the two segments which are now taking
place , it might be helpful if the Soviet Union and this nation
were to stand to the side and let the lead pass to smaller
European states on both sides.
The efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States
might well be concentrated, instead , on disarmament, reductions
of their forces

~~\JJ~
and the control of nuclear weapons

in ~urope ,

which tave been pursued for so many years .

In this connection ,

some risks for peace are clear ly indicated if we are to reduce
the ever- present and catastrophic risk of the collapse of human
civilization that is inherent in international nuclear anarchy .

To be sure, the nuclear test ban treaty, the SALT agreement ,

(.~

and other peripheral undertakings represent significant advances
but they provide far from sufficient protection against the
threat of nuclear destruction which from second to second hangs
over all of us .

~

ck

JJ~ f ~ ~ .L-eL ~
~
~ ~ rA~ 'Yf +- S:.~r £. .,v, tJyJ- ~ - ~
~

(juJyv

~~~y.vt~~~~
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As for the nuclear non- proliferation treaty, it is,
in my judgment , unrealistic for those who already possess
nuclear weapons to ask other great states capable of producing
them to refrain from doing so indefinitely unless --and I stress
the word unless- - such possessing states are themselves prepared
to show the way in reducing and ending the nuclear threat .

It

is not enough for them merely to put ceilings on their already
excessive nuclear ar senals .
on this question .

The need is to move in new ways

In the current talks, it seems to me that

the nuclear powers might well consider adding to the Treaty on
non- proliferation a fixed time span, perhaps ten years, within
which they would pledge mutual reductions of stockpiles and
progress towar ds banning-- in the manner of poison gas--or in the
control of usage of nuclear weapons by means of generally
acceptable international mechanisms.

Whether the United Nations

can be reconstituted to play a significant role in this process,
I do not know, but some international authority, it seems to
me, must be involved .

In any event, unless some tangible

- 25 progress of this kind is made, it is not likely that states
capable of producing nuclear weapons are going to remain fo r
long outside the inner circle of nuclear

powe~

in international

re: ations .
If I may sum up, then, the need for the era ahead, as
I see it, will be to get away from the excesses of an indis criminate and, in many respects, increasingly disillusioning
and isolated internationalism which has characterized our
policies for the past two or three decades .

We mu~t

try to

recast our relations with others to the end that they are
multilateral and mutual in substance as well as in name .

------

Insofar as the United States is concerned , this
transition and development of policy must derive from Presidential leadership but it must not derive from Executive fiat .
If it is to find firm roots in our nation, any formulation of
U.

s.

policy must depend on a concerted effort in which the

President is joined by the

~nate

anQ-the Congress , with each

respectful of the Constitutional sensibilities of the other .

- 26 It will depend on the many

~

~~*st~universities

sources of enlightenment in the nation .

and other

It will depend on a

government which can be trusted by an informed people because
it is credible in what it says and does and because it is alert
and responsive to their needs and to the needs of the nation .
You who graduate , today, and your counterparts throughout the nation, loom large in what may be anticipated during
the decades ahead .

With the vote, you are in a position to

make your \'Ieight felt in· the conduct of the government.

You

have such wisdom and training as education can provide.

Those

are highly important assets for your coming role in joining in
shaping the nation's future.

Beyond it , however, there is the

part which the younger generation will have played in ending
the tragedy of the involvement in Indochina .

I, for one, of

an older generation will applaud and thank you if you help to
see to it that tragedies of that kind are not repeated.
move beyond

To

S~E~Ast"
Pl&m into a future of world understanding and

l~i et
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peace will devolve heavily on you.

To open a new era of

constructive cooperation with the rest of the human race, to
act with compassion and with high purpose for the welfare of
the people of this nation and the world , that is your opportunity, you who are the "new hands" of tomorrow .
life which lies ahead.

( May

YOll

make

It is your nation .

the most oi' them

al~ .

~

It is your

It is your world.

~~·~-~

1

~0--k_.,{

